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The Constitutional Case for Regulating
Human Germline Genetic Modification
by NANCY PHAM*
"The final stage is come when Man by eugenics, by pre-natal
conditioning... ,has obtained full control over himself. Human
nature will be the last part of Nature to surrender to Man. The
battle will then be won. We shall ... be henceforth free to make
our species whatever we wish it to be. The battle will indeed be
won. But who, precisely, will have won it?"1
I. Introduction
"First GM [Genetically Modified] Humans Created," the headlines
shouted in May 2001 2 Researchers at the Institute for Reproductive
Medicine and Science of St. Barnabas in New Jersey announced that the
first genetically altered humans "have been born and are healthy."3
"Specifically, these researchers transplanted ooplasm from donor eggs into
the eggs of [infertile] women" with defective ooplasm.4 The transplant
inadvertently resulted in the transfer of mitochondrial DNA ("mtDNA")
containing a small amount of additional genes not inherited from either
biological parent. Though the transplant was technically a successful
human germline intervention, human germline genetic modification
* J.D. candidate, May 2007. The author is grateful for the support of Dr. Nigel M. de S. Cameron
and the Institute on Biotechnology and the Human Future without which this Note would not be
possible. Many thanks to Professor Lois Weithom whose invaluable input, comments, and
patience helped shape this Note. Special thanks to my mom and brother, Anthony, for their never
ending support.
1. CLIVE S. LEWIS, TiE ABOLITION OF MAN 59 (2001).
2. Joe Cummins & Mae-Wan Ho, First GM Humans Created, ISIS NEWS, July 2001,
http://www.i-sis.org.uk/isisnews/i-sisnews9-4.php.
3. David Whitehouse, Genetically Altered Babies Born, BBC NEWS ONLINE, May 4, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1312708.stm.
4. Cummins & Ho, supra note 2.
5. Id.
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("HGGM") 6 normally refers to techniques performed to create a permanent
inheritable genetic change in offspring and future descendants by
intentionally altering the genetic makeup of the human germline 7 or early
human embryos.8
Researchers have not yet attempted intentional HGGM, but inheritable
genetic modifications have been successful in animals dating back to the
first genetically altered mouse in 1976. 9 With the rapid rate of advancing
technology as well as the promise of artificial human chromosomes
("HACs") and retroviral techniques, human germline intervention may be
possible in the near future. 10 Though HGGM is not yet a reality, many
infertile couples have already utilized preimplantation genetic diagnosis
("PGD") to achieve similar results." PGD refers to the procedure involved
in obtaining a genetic diagnosis prior to embryo implantation in
conjunction with in vitro fertilization ("IVF").12  After the diagnosis is
obtained, only the healthy embryos are implanted and brought to full
term.' 3 Following the PGD, parents can choose the gender of their children
and even screen out genetic defects. 14 The results of PGD do not affect
future generations but do implicate some of the fears and concerns of
germline intervention such as the lack of regulation, slippery slope to
eugenics,15 devaluation of human life, and constrained choice and free will
of the resulting child.
6. For the purpose of this note, the terms "human gernline intervention," "human
inheritable genetic modification," "human germline genetic modification" will be used
synonymously to refer to manipulations to the human genome that will be inherited by all future
descendants.
7. Germline means eggs, sperm, and the cells that give rise to eggs and sperms.
8. For a summary of the science behind HGGM, see SUSANNAH BARUCH,, HUMAN
GERML1NE GENETIC MODIFICATION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 11-20 (2005),
available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/reportpdfs/HumanGermlineGeneticMod.pdf.
9. For more examples of inheritable genetic modifications done on animals, see Institute on
Biotechnology and the Human Future, http://www.thehumanfuture.org/topics/
germlineintervention/background.html#research (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
10. See, e.g., Kevin R. Smith, Gene Therapy: The Potential Applicability of Gene Transfer
Technology to the Human Germline, 1(2) INT'L J. MED. SCI. 79 (2004); Steve Connor, Science &
Technology: Creating the Stuff of Life, THE INDEP. (UK), March 16, 2005.
11. Sherry F. Colb, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis: Should Our Laws Allow Parents to








This note will examine whether access to HGGM technology is a
constitutionally protected right' 6 focusing on a traditional substantive due
process analysis 7 and then further addressing alternative arguments set
forth in several' 8 Supreme Court cases-since it is unclear which test the
Court would apply.' 9  Under traditional substantive due process,
constitutional protection turns on whether the right is fundamental.20 If the
courts deem human germline intervention fundamental, then it would fall in
line with the category of reproductive decision-making cases such as
Griswold v. Connecticut.2 1 Moreover, such a classification would require
states to have a compelling interest before restricting the right at all. 2
However, if human germline intervention is not a fundamental right, then
states must only show a legitimate interest under rational basis review.2 3 I
argue that HGGM will be deemed unconstitutional under the traditional
substantive due process law because: (1) courts will not recognize HGGM
as a fundamental right based on current case law; and (2) even if it were a
fundamental right, state regulation would meet the compelling interests
test.
Alternatively, under the undue burden analysis implemented in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, because the standard set by the Court is so
ambiguous, it is hard to determine whether HGGM laws will be upheld or
invalidated. 4 In addition, I will analyze HGGM as a liberty interest as set
forth in Lawrence v. Texas. 5 Then I will discuss some of the state interests
involved and whether the Court will find them sufficient based on the
16. For a constitutional analysis of PGD and sex selection, see Rachel E. Remaley, Note,
"The Original Sexist Sin": Regulating Preconception Sex Selection Technology, 10 HEALTH
MATRIX 249 (2000).
17. 1 use the term "traditional substantive due process" to refer to the substantive due
process analysis used in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which asks if the right in question is
fundamental.
18. The alternatives to traditional substantive due process include the undue burden analysis
delineated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) and the liberty interest
discussed in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
19. The Supreme Court's analysis of substantive due process has been murky, with a shift
from analyzing privacy rights to liberty interests. Thus, I will discuss each test and the resulting
implications.
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. Also known as strict scrutiny. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
23. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
24. See David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication,
88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 643 (1994).
25. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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analysis applied. Further, I will consider what means of regulation states
can implement without violating the Constitution. Finally, this note will
address policy considerations and regulation. Ultimately, society needs
some sort of regulation to guide these burgeoning technologies that have
the potential to literally change the human race.
II. The Constitutional Framework
According to one law professor, "constitutional adjudication is in a
state of disarray. 26 Because no one is sure what analysis the Supreme
Court would currently apply to HGGM, this note will discuss each
potentially implicated constitutional test.
27
A. Traditional Substantive Due Process and Fundamental Rights
In a line of procreative liberty cases beginning with Griswold,28 the
Supreme Court has "recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution., 29 The Court specifically located this right to privacy in the
Fourteenth Amendment's conception of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action-often referred to as substantive due process. The
personal privacy guarantee only protects "fundamental" personal rights.3°
However, this privacy right is not absolute. Regulations limiting these
rights can be justified by a compelling state interest; any legislation must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interest implicated
(strict scrutiny review).31 On the other hand, if the personal right is not
fundamental, then it undergoes rational basis review, under which states
may restrict that right in order to satisfy any legitimate state interest.32
Courts have traditionally recognized reproductive decisions as
fundamental; thus, they fall under the privacy guarantee. The Court first
recognized the fundamental nature of reproduction in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
26. Faigman, supra note 24, at 643.
27. For an alternative constitutional analysis to the ones examined in this note, see id.
Faigman suggests a constitutional adjudication that balances the depth of the full constitutional
infringement, an aggregate of all rights, with the government's justification for its action.
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 484 (1965). The Court stated that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy" (internal
citations omitted). Id.
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 155.
32. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
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by invalidating a criminal law and characterizing reproduction as "one of
the basic civil rights of man., 33 The Court went on to state that "[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." 34 The Court expanded the protection in the pivotal contraception
case, Griswold v. Connecticut, by striking down legislation which
prevented married couples from obtaining contraceptives. 35  Using the
privacy right later summarized in Roe the Court noted that "the Connecticut
anti-use statute invades a protected area of privacy and association or that it
demeans the marriage relationship. 36  The Court explicitly applied the
privacy guarantee to reproduction-for the first time in Griswold-but
because the statute only applied to married couples, it was unclear whether
the privacy right extended outside the marital context. In Eisenstadt v.
Baird, the Supreme Court addressed the question unanswered in Griswold:
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child., 37 Finally, the Court held that the right of privacy was
"broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy" in its landmark decision legalizing abortion.38
These cases make clear that procreative liberty, specifically the
decision whether or not to have a child, is a fundamental right falling under
the privacy guarantee located within traditional substantive due process.
Any state legislation in this realm, therefore, triggers strict scrutiny and
requires a state to demonstrate a compelling interest before it may regulate.
1. Is HGGM a Fundamental Right Warranting Strict Scrutiny?
Before we can assess if HGGM is a fundamental right that fits within
the procreativity liberty framework, we must define "fundamental right."
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court noted that "fundamental" is
a concept that is hard to objectify, but that a fundamental interest is one
"traditionally protected by our society." 39 The Court further explained that
the Due Process Clause affords only those protections "so rooted in the
33. 316 U.S 535, 541 (1942).
34. Id.
35. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 503 (1965).
36. Id.
37. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
39. 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
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traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. 4 °
The Supreme Court also emphasized that "respect for the teachings of
history [and a] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society" are necessary before a right is classified as fundamental. 41 Other
decisions have categorized rights as fundamental when the "right involved
is of such a character that cannot be denied without violating those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions.
' 'A2
According to Vanderbilt University Professor of Law and Biological
Sciences Owen Jones, this line of reasoning suggests a two-part inquiry to
determine whether a right will be recognized as fundamental: (1) historical
evidence of our society's traditional protection of the right; and (2)
evidence indicating that the right is a basic societal value.43 Under Jones'
first prong, the right to HGGM would fail to be fundamental because
society has never traditionally protected an individual's right to genetically
modify a child. Applying Jones' second prong, the end result of HGGM-
having a genetically healthy child-may be a basic societal value.
However, the means of obtaining that result, genetic manipulation, is not
necessarily a basic societal value. In fact, many U.S. researchers who
generally support the advancement of technology have criticized the
production of genetically altered children. 44
The language of the reproduction cases suggests that our basic societal
values may not support genetic modification. Skinner, which underscored
reproduction as a basic right of man, is not dispositive because having
children is distinguishable from having children a certain way (e.g.
determining traits).45 Likewise, the language in Eisenstadt is to "beget a
child., 46 Clearly there is a difference between passing on one's own genes
and being able to use genetic manipulation to create a child according to
one's own preferences. The former entails a basic human right to replicate;
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
41. Id. at 122-23 (internal quotations omitted).
42. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 493 (1965) (internal quotations omitted).
43. Owen Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling the Predetermination of a
Child's Gender, 6 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 1, 37 (1992).
44. Whitehouse, supra note 3. Many scientists deem human genetic modification to be
unethical, especially because of the limitations of our current knowledge about the procedure and
the human germline in general. In addition, scientists criticize researchers that conduct these
modifications privately, without the public's knowledge or approval, thus sneaking human
germline modification through the back door.
45. Michael H. Shapiro, Does Technological Enhancement of Human Traits Threaten
Human Equality and Democracy?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 769, 833 (2002).
46. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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the latter an additional power to control the terms of that replication.47 The
ability to pass on more than half of one's genes-such as modifying a gene
to increase intelligence-goes beyond what ordinarily occurs in
reproduction and should, therefore, fail to receive the substantive due
process protection enjoyed by traditional reproduction.48
Additionally, Roe and Casey were decided not only on values of
procreative liberty, but also on rules of bodily integrity.49 That is, bodily
integrity was doing some of the work along with a woman's right to make
reproductive decisions. However, bodily integrity plays no part in genetic
modification. Unlike the right to abortion, without which a woman would
bear the burden of physically carrying her child to term, a woman who
chooses HGGM would already have made the decision to bear the burden
of physically carrying her child to term. Since HGGM raises no bodily
integrity issue, the Supreme Court has less rationale for categorizing access
to HGGM as a fundamental right.
Another factor to consider is how the relevant right is defined. The
manner in which the Court frames the right is crucial because the level of
generality is often dispositive of whether the right is fundamental.5° For
example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the majority classified the right as the
right to engage in "homosexual sodomy"'" rather than the right to engage in
the intimate association of one's choosing, as suggested by the dissent.1
2
This narrowly framed right was likely dispositive in the Court's decision to
uphold Georgia's criminal sodomy statute. However, the Court overruled
Bowers when it adopted a broader view of the same right in Lawrence v.
Texas. There, the Supreme Court classified the right as "intimate
conduct., 53  Some argue that Lawrence signals the death of the narrow
approach to defining rights,54 but cases still remain where the Court
47. Jones, supra note 43, at 39.
48. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J. L. & MED.
439, 472 (2003).
49. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
50. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73-
112 (1991).
51. 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986).
52. Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
54. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right " That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1898-99 (2004) (noting that the Lawrence Court took the
Bowers Court to task for the way it had formulated the question for decision and altering the
historical trajectory of substantive due process).
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adopted a narrow approach like the one in Bowers.5 5 Furthermore, the
Court has the discretion to use whichever definition it sees fit, whether
broad or narrow. As applied to HGGM, the right could be defined broadly
as "the right to make decisions regarding reproduction" or more narrowly
as "the right to genetically modify one's child." The category of rights that
includes HGGM is probably most accurately described as "the right to
choose the genetic or physical characteristics of one's child using alternate
reproductive technology. 56  Indeed, the preceding analysis assumed a
definition like this one to determine that HGGM would not likely be
recognized as a fundamental right.
Instead, if the right to HGGM was defined broadly as "the right to
make decisions regarding reproduction," then it would fit neatly into the
procreative liberty cases described thus far. Since this is a somewhat
disingenuous classification of HGGM,57 because it is radically different
from traditional reproduction, I will hereinafter analyze HGGM assuming
the appropriate categorical definition to be "the right to choose the genetic
or physical characteristics of one's child using alternate reproductive
technology.
58
Even under this more narrow definition, it is possible for the Supreme
Court to find that HGGM is a fundamental right.59  If HGGM were
recognized as a fundamental right, the designation would likely rest on how
"centrally or intimately connected" HGGM is to reproductive decision-
making. 60  For example, if parents would only have a child if that child
could be genetically modified, then the choice to use HGGM "would be
presumptively protected under the principles that underlay the Court's
decisions and dicta to date [regarding reproduction], and be subject to
limitation only if [its] use posed great harm to others.'
55. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 708 (1997) (defining the right as
"physician-assisted suicide" rather than a broader classification such as the right to die, and using
a traditional analysis similar to that in its Bowers opinion).
56. Jodi Danis, Sexism and "The Superfluous Female": Arguments for Regulating Pre-
Implantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J., 219, 248 (1995).
57. See id. at 247 (noting that Professor Tribe "recognizes that an extremely broad definition
of a relevant right is not always the appropriate solution to the problem of specificity").
58. Id. at 248.
59. See John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering:
Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274, 1285-87
(1986).
60. Robertson, supra note 48, at 454.
61. Id.
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Furthermore, surveys reveal that a majority of Americans approve of
HGGM to avoid fatal childhood disease or avoid adult-onset disease.62
Indeed most, if not all, parents wish to have a child free of genetic
abnormality and disease.63 In addition, parents can legally use PGD
followed by non-implantation of unsatisfactory embryos (e.g., undesired
gender, genetic disease) or prenatal screening and abortion to bear only
children with desired traits. In fact, there is no legislation restricting these
technologies, which suggests that the public may also desire that HGGM be
similarly unrestricted. Americans may consider HGGM a preferable and
more humane alternative to PGD and selective abortions, as HGGM
involves manipulation of the early embryo rather than the discarding of
unwanted embryos or abortion of existing fetuses.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court is unlikely to classify HGGM as a
fundamental right because it is radically different from traditional
reproduction and does not involve a woman's bodily integrity, which was
part of the rationale in Roe and Casey. Indeed, the Court noted in Roe "that
the protected sphere of liberty does not include all childbearing activity.
' 64
Even if parents claimed that they would not have children without genetic
modification, thus arguably affecting their decision to procreate in the first
place, the Court is still unlikely to view HGGN as a fundamental right
because the parents' reproduction and their children's reproduction could
easily occur without resort to genetic enhancement.65
Moreover, constitutional challenges to PGD that may justify state
restriction weaken the argument to recognize HGGM as a fundamental
right based on the nation's acceptance of PGD.66 Additionally, the lack of
regulation regarding PGD could be viewed as an administrative oversight
rather than as societal approval of the technology. Affirmatively modifying
62. Baruch, supra note 8, at 31 (the Center's 2004 survey of 4,834 Americans found that 57
percent approved of HGGM to avoid fatal childhood disease, while 51 percent approved of
HGGM to avoid adult-onset disease).
63. The desire to have children free of genetic disease or abnormalities (the removal of
negative traits) is defined as therapeutic germline intervention, while using germline intervention
for enhancement is the addition of positive traits such as increased intelligence or attractiveness.
This may be an important distinction in regulating HGGM, but the line distinguishing the two can
often be blurred.
64. See Attanasio, supra note 59, at 1287 ("[Earlier decisions] also make it clear that the
right has some extension to activities relating to marriage,. .. procreation,... contraception,...
family relationships.., and child rearing and education" (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973)) (emphasis added and citations omitted)).
65. Robertson, supra note 48, at 478.
66. See Remaley, supra note 16 (arguing that even if PGD was protected as a fundamental
right, there are compelling state interests that justify restrictions of the technology).
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a child's germline, which will affect all descendants, is radically different
from choosing not to have a specific child via PGD or abortion.
Finally, the Court has been hesitant to extend the sphere of
fundamental rights,67 and would be even less likely to extend it to such a
radically new and different technology with such far-reaching effects.
Therefore, the Supreme Court most likely will not find that HGGM is a
fundamental right protected under substantive due process. As such, strict
scrutiny would not apply and the states would not need to show a
compelling interest in order to regulate the use of HGGM.
2. Rational Basis Review
If the Supreme Court does not recognize HGGM as a fundamental
right, it will use a rational basis review to evaluate the constitutionality of a
law that restricts HGGM. Rational basis review asks if the legislation is
"rationally" related to a "legitimate" state interest.68  This is a very
deferential standard which merely questions whether a law is irrational or
arbitrary. Alternatively, the Court has recently applied a slightly more
searching version of rational basis review, which some have termed
"rational basis with bite., 69
Under traditional rational basis review, the Court will uphold a statute
unless it is completely arbitrary, even if finding a rational basis requires the
Court to "supply its own purpose to justify the statute. 7° In contrast, under
rational basis with bite, the Court will not defer to the legislature and will
actually examine the state's interests justifying the regulation. 71 As I argue
below, states will likely be able to comply with strict scrutiny and
67. Thomas Stuart Patterson, Note, The Outer Limits of Human Genetic Engineering: A
Constitutional Examination of Parents' Procreative Liberty to Genetically Enhance Their
Offspring, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 913, 926 (1999). The author notes that the Court has
upheld state laws that: (1) refuse to fund abortions from welfare; (2) prohibit using public
facilities to perform abortions; (3) prohibit public employees from performing abortions; while
invalidating state laws that require waiting periods and parental notification for minors. Id. at 926
n.114. See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (upholding a ban on
physician-assisted suicide by tailoring the right so narrowly that it was not deemed fundamental
and by applying rational basis review).
68. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
69. Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 787 (1987).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying
rational basis with bite and striking down a statute burdening the right of the mentally retarded to
live in a group home); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
(implementing rational basis with bite to strike down a state law prohibiting same-sex partners
from obtaining marriage licenses).
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demonstrate a compelling state interests for restricting HGGM even if
HGGM is classified as a fundamental right. Consequently, rational basis
review and even rational basis with bite will be met as well as these
thresholds are much lower than that of strict scrutiny.
B. Alternatives to Traditional Substantive Due Process and
Fundamental Rights
The Supreme Court has employed means of analysis other than
substantive due process to adjudicate constitutional rights. Constitutional
jurisprudence is murky precisely because the Court has implemented these
different tests and it is difficult to pinpoint which test it might use.
1. Undue Burden
One alternative constitutional analysis is the "undue burden" test,
which the Court applied in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.72  There, the
Court held that an undue burden "exists, and therefore a provision of law is
invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking abortion . . . . Performing an undue burden
analysis, however, is problematic because the test is unclear. What exactly
is a substantial obstacle? What population should the Court use in the
analysis? Indeed, the lack of clarity was evident in the opinion itself, as
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter upheld a twenty-four hour waiting
period while simultaneously invalidating a spousal notification provision,
even though "the quantum of evidence was virtually the same as to whether
either posed a 'substantial obstacle' to the exercise of the abortion right.,
74
The undue burden standard is indefinite at best and could result in HGGM
regulation being upheld or invalidated with equal likelihood.75
Furthermore, before the undue burden analysis can be applied to
HGGM regulation, the Court will first have to recognize access to HGGM
as a right on par with the right to abortion.7 6 As discussed in the previous
72. 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992). In Casey, the Court restructured the right to abortion at
the same time that it purportedly upheld Roe. The Court divided pregnancy into pre-viability and
post-viability stages. During pre-viability, a state may regulate abortion as long as it does not
place an "undue burden" on the woman's decision to abort. Id. at 877. During post-viability,
states may regulate to the extent of proscribing abortion (except where necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother). Id. at 878. The Court upheld Pennsylvania's informed consent
provisions, a twenty-four hour waiting period, a one-parent consent requirement (with a judicial
bypass provision), certain record-keeping requirements, and struck down a spousal notification
requirement. Id. at 881-901.
73. Id. at 877.
74. Faigman, supra note 24, at 643.
75. See infra Part Il.
76. See Jones, supra note 43, at 40.
section,77 the language of the Court's decisions to date casts doubt on
whether it would equate the two rights. It is also unclear whether the
Supreme Court will apply the undue burden analysis outside the context of
abortion.
2. Liberty
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas sodomy
statute78 defining the relevant right as "intimate conduct., 79 The Court then
proceeded to search history and foreign sources to attempt to find a
justification for recognizing the right as fundamental (although the Court
never used that word).80  The Court ultimately declared that the Texas
statute "furthers no legitimate state interest. ' 81 In a confusing twist, despite
the fact that the Court searched history in order to recognize intimate
conduct, including homosexual sex, as a fundamental right-which should
have triggered strict scrutiny-the Court instead invoked rational basis
review.
82
Randy E. Barnett, the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Law at Boston
University, proposes a reading of Lawrence that makes sense of the Court's
analysis.83 He notes that the Lawrence majority did not protect a "right of
privacy," but instead protected "liberty. 84  For example, the majority
stated, "the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners
were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their
liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution., 85 In fact, the word "liberty" appears twenty-five times in the
majority opinion,86 from which Barnett concludes that "liberty, not privacy
is doing all the work., 87  What he calls the "presumption of liberty"
changes the burden of proof and "requires the government to justify its
restriction on liberty, instead of requiring the citizen to establish that the
77. See supra Part II.A. 1.
78. 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
79. Id. at 567.
80. Id. at 568-74.
81. Id. at 578.
82. See id ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.") (emphasis added).
83. Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21.
84. Id.
85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).
86. Barnett, supra note 83, at 34.
87. Id.
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liberty being exercised is somehow 'fundamental.' ' 88  Under this liberty
analysis, "once an action is deemed to be a proper exercise of liberty...
the burden shifts to the government." 89 In Lawrence, the only rationale the
state offered to justify the statute was their belief that sodomy was
immoral; which for the majority was simply not enough to justify the
restriction of liberty.
90
Assuming the Supreme Court finds the use of HGGM a proper
exercise of liberty,9' the only guide under this analysis is that morality
alone is not sufficient to justify its regulation. Since most of the states'
interests in restricting HGGM 92 are stronger than the morality rationale,
93
they would likely be sufficient to warrant regulation of the liberty interest.
94
Il. State Interests and Means of Regulation
States have numerous compelling and legitimate interests that,
depending on the test or analysis applied, would justify legislation banning
or substantially limiting HGGM. As Professor Ann MacLean Massie
notes, there is a distinction between belief and conduct, the latter of which
potentially harms third parties. 95 Although in the abortion context the
Court has recognized a First Amendment right to "define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life,",96 in the past, laws have been upheld despite religious
objections because to do otherwise would cause harm to others.97 In other
words, where unfettered reproductive liberty causes harm, states may
constitutionally regulate that liberty.
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. IfHGGM is not classified as a proper exercise of liberty, which may be the case since it
is so new and has an effect that could harm the genetically modified child and his descendants,
then there is no constitutional protection, and states are free to regulate as they please.
92. Here, I assume that HGGM would be recognized as a proper exercise of liberty. Of
course, if it is not, the analysis ends and states may freely regulate HGGM.
93. These include protecting the health, safety, and Fourteenth Amendment personhood
rights of children,. See infra Part III.
94. Note that Glucksberg, which uses the traditional substantive due process analysis, is still
good law. There, the Court framed the relevant right narrowly as "the right to assisted suicide"
and then held that it was not fundamental. 521 U.S. at 708. Thus it is unclear whether the Court
would rely on traditional substantive due process or their Lawrence analysis in examining the
constitutionality of HGGM. It could indeed fall back on traditional substantive due process.
95. Ann MacLean Massie, Regulating Choice: A Constitutional Law Response to Professor
John A. Robertson's Children of Choice, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 135, 154 (1995).
96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
97. Some examples are anti-polygamy, anti-child labor, and universal immunization laws.
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Under traditional substantive due process, there are two tiers of review
as already discussed. First, if a right is fundamental, then strict scrutiny
applies and any regulation must be narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest. Second, if the right is not fundamental, then
rational basis review applies, and any regulation must be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest-a very minimal threshold under which most
statutes pass constitutional muster. As an alternative to the traditional
substantive due process analysis, the Court could apply two different tests.
The first is "rational basis with bite," which is more exacting test than
traditional rational basis review but less searching than strict scrutiny. The
second is the liberty analysis set forth in Lawrence, which requires a
legitimate state interest before the government can restrict an individual's
liberty- essentially rational review-assuming the right is classified as a
proper exercise of liberty.
I will now describe some possible state interests and means of
regulation, analyzing each according to the preceding framework to
determine if the interest is sufficient to justify state regulation. This note
will not focus on the undue burden analysis because that analysis turns on
whether the legislation creates a substantial obstacle for individuals rather
than focusing on the state interest.
98
A. State Interests in Protecting the Genetically Modified Child
1. Safety Risks
"Even the strongest enthusiasts agree that no existing method of
altering genes in embryos is sufficiently safe and effective to attempt in
humans." 99 Findings in animal studies cast further doubt on whether the
technology would be safe in humans. For instance, there are problems
98. Because the undue burden analysis focuses on whether the regulation is an "undue
burden" or a "substantial obstacle," no balancing against a state interest is implicated. If the
restriction is an undue burden, then the regulation will presumably be invalidated. Therefore, the
state interests will not be examined in light of the undue burden analysis. Instead the analysis
focuses on the effects of the law in question. Application of the undue burden analysis requires
an initial assumption that the Court will treat HGGM as the equivalent of the abortion right.
Then, if the law created an outright ban on HGGM, it would most likely be a substantial obstacle
to HGGM. However, if the law permitted parents to use HGGM only after a review board
determines it is in the child's best interest, based on specific congressional guidelines, the Court
could easily hold the law is not an undue burden. The Court's decision would depend on the
particular law, and as noted previously, the decision could be arbitrary because the undue burden
analysis is indefinite.
99. Rebecca Dresser, Designing Babies: Human Research Issues, IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN
RESEARCH, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 3.
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regarding "low efficiency and low rate of integration into the genome."
100
One GFP study conducted on monkeys, a species with a genetic makeup
that closely matches the human genome, "resulted in only one live birth out
of forty implanted embryos actually expressing the gene."' 1 1 Researchers
can identify effective GFP procedures because the altered genes glow
under a special light. 0 2  Thus, researchers can study the presence or
absence of the GFP in the tissues and organs of the resulting offspring.1
0 3
Only one monkey (2.5 percent of implanted embryos) "was born with the
altered GFP gene present in all tissues, although no fluorescence was
observed."' 1 4 This suggests that the newly introduced genes functioned
poorly or not at all, demonstrating that the technique is "not yet refined
enough to be useful.
10 5
"In addition to the low initial gene implantation and expression rates
evinced in the GFP studies, there are also problems that manifest later in
the life of the animals following the event of successful gene
integration.' 106 "Genes expressed in wrong tissues or in the developmental
stage may have deleterious effects on the proper functioning of the cell,
tissues, or organ, causing problems such as developmental complications,
sterility, and cancer."'
0 7
In light of the current state of medical technology, HGGM is unsafe
and could likely lead to illness and potentially to premature death. If
HGGM was recognized as a fundamental right under traditional substantive
due process, these safety risks would probably rise to the level of a
compelling state interest. Not only is the safety of the genetically modified
individual at risk, but also that individual's entire line of descendants. As
such, the state interest in protecting these individual's safety should be
sufficient to meet strict scrutiny. 0 8 If these safety concerns are sufficient to
satisfy strict scrutiny, then they must, by definition, also satisfy rational
basis review and rational basis with bite. HGGM supporters could argue
that these safety risks will improve with more research and be a non-issue
in the future. However, the state of the technology now poses serious risks








108. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987,
998 (2002) (reasoning that similar safety concerns involved in human cloning would satisfy even
the most stringent standard of review).
Fall 2006] CHOICE V. CHANCE
to the genetically modified child, so much so that HGGM would surely be
regulated if not banned completely. 109
Even a total ban on HGGM might be considered narrowly tailored
enough to pass constitutional muster due to the immense safety risks and
hazards of HGGM. 1" ° Alternatively, a total ban might be overly broad,
especially if the technology advances to the point that safety risks are
dramatically reduced. In such a case, one possible narrowly tailored
restriction is to prohibit HGGM for enhancement purposes while allowing
it for therapeutic purposes. Therapeutic HGGM would eliminate negative
traits such as genetic abnormalities and disease. In contrast, enhancement
HGGM would add positive traits such as increased athleticism or
intelligence. Because HGGM done for therapeutic purposes would
eliminate abnormalities and potentially life threatening disease, the
Supreme Court might find that this benefit would outweigh safety risks.
Thus, the Court might find a law that allows therapeutic HGGM while
prohibiting genetic enhancements to be narrowly tailored to advance the
compelling state interest in safety.
Under the liberty analysis, once an action is deemed to be a proper
exercise of liberty,"' the burden shifts to the government to justify its
restriction on that liberty." 2 Since Lawrence only required a legitimate
state interest, safety risks that endanger the genetically modified
individual's life will likely be sufficient to restrict HGGM. Indeed, health
and safety concerns regarding HGGM are much stronger justifications for
restricting liberty than the immorality rationale at work in Lawrence.
Therefore, safety risks would likely be sufficient to justify nearly any
restriction of HGGM. However, since the Court's language speaks only of
restrictions, it would probably invalidate a complete ban because it does
more than restrict but rather fully bars access to HGGM.
2. Psychological and Mental Well Being
Many believe that allowing HGGM will lead to designer children who
are chosen instead of unconditionally loved. As one commentator put it,
trait specification will lead to a "contingency devaluation risk" with the
previous unconditional acceptance of the children we produce giving way
109. See generally Dresser, supra note 99 (discussing the safety risks of HGGM generally as
well as the safety standards necessary in order to experiment with inheritable genetic
modifications on humans).
110. Sunstein, supra note 108, at 998.
111. For the remainder of Part III, I will assume that the Supreme Court will find HGGM to
be a proper exercise of liberty, making the liberty analysis applicable.
112. Barnett, supra note 83, at 36.
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to an acceptance contingent on the success of our genetic design attempts,
as measured by the success of the persons designed.1 13 Arguably, this
conditional acceptance, inherent in HGGM and a valuation based on
success, may affect the psychological health of genetically modified
children, as parents choose and evaluate their children instead of accepting
and unconditionally loving them.
However, this harm is largely speculative, because it is difficult to
predict how a genetically modified child will react. Perhaps the child will
view his parents' decision to genetically modify him as an act of love. This
is especially true if the modification eliminated a genetic disorder. Because
the psychological harm is so speculative, the Court might hold that
regulating it is not a compelling state interest under strict scrutiny. In
contrast, psychological harm and mental well-being may satisfy rational
basis review since it is an extremely deferential standard. The Supreme
Court will likely find protecting genetically modified children from
psychological harm a legitimate state interest, thus permitting states to
regulate HGGM. This interest will also likely survive rational basis with
bite, as the interest in protecting children is weighty and a restriction is not
arbitrary if it will prevent the harm. Likewise, the Court will likely allow
state regulation of HGGM if it applies the liberty analysis, which also only
requires a legitimate state interest.
3. Sanctity of Life
Professor Laurence Tribe proposes that reproductive technologies,
which allow for trait selection and children molded by preference such as
HGGM, may threaten "the concept and the reality of the human person as a
unique and intrinsically valuable entity."' 4  People would no longer be
inherently and uniquely worthy and special. Instead, genetically modified
children-and all of humanity-would be reduced to a catalogue of ideal
traits, such as athleticism, intelligence, and beauty. Since this interest is
moral in nature, it will not survive strict scrutiny 15 but may satisfy rational
basis review or rational basis with bite when considered with additional
state interests. Under the liberty analysis, the Supreme Court will
invalidate any law restricting access to HGGM based on sanctity of life, a
reflection of morality, just as it struck down the statute in Lawrence.
113. Michael H. Shapiro, Fragmenting and Reassembling the World: Of Flying Squirrels,
Augmented Persons, and Other Monsters, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 348-49 (1990).
114. Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of
Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 648 (1973).
115. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
Fall 2006)
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
B. The Genetically Modified Child's Fourteenth Amendment
Personhood Rights
Since the purpose of HGGM is to create a living child, that child has
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. When a parent
chooses to genetically modify a child, the modification will them be passed
along to all future descendants as well. Thus, these rights include
autonomy in its bodily integrity, which must be recognized and
protected. 16 Unlike Roe and other abortion cases, in which the Court did
not recognize a fetus as a person under the Fourteenth Amendment,
HGGM's purpose is to create a living child rather than to terminate the life
of a fetus before its rights can be taken into account. In fact, the Court held
in Casey that "the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting... the life of the fetus that may become a
child."1 17 Because the use of HGGM produces a living child, states have an
even stronger compelling interest in protecting that child. To dismiss the
genetically modified child's rights by saying that it is better to be born than
not, as Professor Robertson argues in Children of Choice," 8 "makes too
short a shrift of a concern central to the reproductive technologies debate-
namely, what we should do to ensure the physical, mental, and
psychological well-being of the children whom we are deliberately
bringing into existence." 119
To recognize its rights only after the child is born would be too late
because the germline intervention will have already been performed and
the genetic destiny of the child and all of her descendants will already be
set in stone. The compelling state interest is not in fetal life, but in the life
of a child who will be born and that child's free will and self-
determination. Cases from various fields of law demonstrate that
genetically modified children have rights even before they would qualify
for personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment.
116. The Skinner Court reaffirmed a right to personal autonomy and a more specific right of
bodily integrity. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (limiting the extent to which the
state may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality of the
individual).
117. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
118. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (1994).
119. Massie, supra note 95, at 145.
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1. Tort Law
Historically in tort law, a fetus (or parents of the fetus) could not
recover for injuries unless it was injured after the point of viability.12 ° Over
time, the courts recognized that, after birth, these children were forced to
live with debilitating conditions due to the negligent actions that affected
them while in the womb--despite the age or development of the child at
the time of injury.' 2' The courts explained that "[w]hether viable or not at
the time of the injury, the child sustains the same harm after birth, and
therefore should be given the same opportunity for redress."' 122 As long as
the child was born, there was a valid cause of action even if the injury
occurred prior to viability.
The courts have gone even further in recognizing tortious actions
against fetuses by allowing a mother to recover for an injury that harmed a
future born child even if the injury was sustained before conception. As
Professor Lori Andrews notes, 123 "the court [in Renslow v. Mennonite
Hospital] reasoned that the cases allowing recovery for pre-viable injuries
have held that a defendant may be liable to a being whose existence was
not apparent, the same type of negligent conduct should not escape liability
simply because it occurred two weeks or two years prior to conception. ,1
24
The Renslow court explicated the underlying impetus behind preconception
torts as the "right to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused
by a breach of duty to the child's mother."'125 Just as tort law recognizes a
duty to the fetus even before it exists (preconception), the state should be
able to protect the child's interest even before it is conceived, at the point
when the parents are deciding to proceed with an inheritable genetic
modification.
2. Property Law
Property law has always recognized even an unborn individual's right
to inherit. For example, with a fee simple absolute (usually designated
with the words "to 0 and his heirs"), the owner's heirs automatically
120. For a general discussion of the status of the fetus within tort law, see Matthew Browne,
Note, Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a Nexus Test for
Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555 (2001).
121. Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOy. L. REv. 357, 381 (1986-87)
("The first court to reject viability as a rule was the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
in the 1953 case of Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 696 (1953).").
122. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960).
123. Lori Andrews is also the Co-founder of the Institute on Biotechnology and the Human
Future.
124. Andrews, supra note 121, at 383.
125. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E. 2d 1250, 1255 (Il1. 1977).
Fall 20061 CHOICE V. CHANCE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
inherit the property if he dies intestate.1 26 The owner's grandchild will
eventually inherit-as long as the property is not sold-even though the
grandchild may not exist during the lifetime of the owner. Similarly, with a
trust, a settlor can designate legal benefits and rights to an unborn
individual-even creating a perpetual dynasty. 27  Thus, property law
recognizes limited property interests of the unborn. At a minimum, a
person may designate an unborn child to inherit or participate in his
estate.128  This recognition of conceptus property rights further supports
allowing states to protect the child's rights before the genetic modification
is done.
3. Parent Versus Child Rights
Parents have a constitutional right to raise children the way they see
fit, 129 but the state can limit and regulate these rights. In this way,
children have an ambiguous status in that they have independent
personhood rights yet are dependent on their parents. 131  The Supreme
Court has generally protected parental autonomy in child-rearing
decisions, 132 which includes decisions where children will live, how they
will be educated, and what values and morals they will be taught.
133
However, there are limitations on parental control; parents cannot fully
control their children's existence once they are born. 134  Although the
decision to genetically modify a child is made prior to birth, HGGM would
dramatically effect the child's life, future, and even descendants because
parents would have already pre-determined certain characteristics of the
child.135 This severe effect after the child's birth warrants limiting parental
rights before the child is born.
13 6
126. T. BERGIN & HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS, 23-26
(1966).
127. Brian Layman, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most Powerful Tools in the Estate
Planner's Arsenal, 32 Akron L. Rev. 747, 748 (1999).
128. Andrews, supra note 121, at 393.
129. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a law which
prohibited children from attending private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(striking down a law which banned teaching children languages other than English).
130. For example, parents cannot abuse their children.
131. John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REv. 421,
480 (1996).
132. See, e.g., Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
133. Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 13 1, at 481.
134. Id. at 479-80.
135. Note that the Supreme Court had held that "a parent's desire for and right to 'the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children' is an important interest
that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection."'
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Indeed, "parents are trustees of their children's separate welfare, not
owners of their personhood."' 137 Parents must provide minimal care such as
food, water, shelter, and education or else they will lose their parental
rights. 138  States have a compelling interest in ensuring children become
healthy, functioning members of society, which justifies the restriction on a
parent's childrearing rights. Courts have even limited parental choices in
child-rearing based upon decisions that go beyond minimal care: for
example, parents can be prevented from using harsh disciplinary practices
to instill a specific religious belief, 139 and from fostering hatred of the other
parent. 40 These cases demonstrate that once a child is born, the state can
protect the child's interests even if that means restricting a parent's child
rearing and First Amendment rights. Because the use of HGGM can
produce a child with genetic predeterminations from which they need
protection, parental rights to use HGGM should be restricted.
The above areas of law suggest that the genetically modified child has
individual interests that states should be allowed to protect by restricting
use of HGGM. Protecting the child's Fourteenth Amendment personhood
rights probably rises to a compelling state interest sufficient to meet strict
scrutiny. This is especially true since the genetic modification would
substantially affect the individual and his future descendants by
predetermining such traits as appearance, personality, and intelligence. If
this state interest is sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny, then by definition it
would also satisfy rational basis review and rational basis with bite.
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972)).
136. The child rearing rights of parents are an alternative way to analyze HGGM outside of
procreative liberty. See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390. Here, the Supreme Court's limits on parental
rights is used in the context of affirming the importance of, and the necessity in, states protecting
a child's Fourteenth Amendment personhood rights rather than in weighing the child rearing
parental rights (including HGGM) against state intervention-the alternate analysis. See also
Danis, supra note 56, at 249-50 (applying the child-rearing analysis to sex selection); Jason C.
Glahn, I Teach You the Superman: Why Congress Cannot Constitutionally Prohibit Genetic
Modification, 25 WHIrTIER L. REv. 409, 430-34 (2003) (arguing that the child rearing analysis is
stronger than reproductive liberty analysis); Patterson, supra note 67, at 929-31 (arguing that
parental rights regarding HGGM would not be protected).
137, Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 131, at 481.
138. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 2004) (penalizing a parent who "willfully omits...
to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter, or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his
or her child"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that "it is a cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents"). The author is
indebted to Robertson's Genetic Selection, supra note 13 1, at 481 n.243 for these references.
139. Peterson v. Peterson, 474 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 1991).
140. See Schutzv. Schutz, 581 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 1991).
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The Supreme Court might find an outright ban to be sufficiently
narrowly tailored to advance the compelling state interest of protecting the
genetically modified child from severe and unchangeable limitations
imposed by his parents. A ban would be necessary to stop all genetic
changes to which the child did not consent. Alternatively, the Court could
see an outright ban as overly broad because it would prevent parents from
eliminating genetic defects or diseases that would substantially limit or
shorten the child's life. In this case, the Court might validate a state law
that prohibited HGGM for enhancement purposes but allowed HGGM for
therapeutic purposes that would save or lengthen the life of the child.
Since strict scrutiny is likely satisfied, and thus also rational basis
review and rational basis with bite, the Court will probably allow state




The human species is continually evolving and adapting. Unfettered
application of inheritable genetic modifications to alter human traits may
undermine the evolutionary progress of the species.' 4' If widely
implemented, HGGM may decrease genetic variation, which is our species'
greatest defense. 142 Reduced diversity could prove disastrous for humans.
For instance, without the proper genetic diversity, a virus could wipe out
the entire human population.143 The use of HGGM to tailor children and all
descendants would reduce genetic diversity since parents would likely
choose similar desired traits such as increased intelligence. Deselected
traits could prove to be adaptive and beneficial in the future, but the human
race will have lost the ability to adapt based on decisions to manipulate the
gene pool today. Because each of the possible public interest arguments
are substantially similar, I will discuss the means of regulation of them
together after describing them separately.
141. Barry Brown, Human Cloning and Genetic Engineering: The Case for Proceeding
Cautiously, 65 ALB. L. REV. 649, 659 (2002).
142. Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 643, 656 (1998) ("Genetic adaptation has allowed the
human species to survive; producing genetically identical humans may therefore be threatening to
the species.").
143. See John R. Harding Jr., Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics and the New Eugenics, 18
PEPP. L. REv. 471 (1991).
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2. Eugenics
The use of HGGM also raises the danger of eugenics-the quest to
create the perfect race. 44 Parents who use HGGM to increase their child's
intelligence or physical ability are indeed agents of eugenics under the
guise of desiring the best for their children. They are in fact manipulating
their children to attain their ideal of perfection not unlike Hitler and his
Nazi compatriots. Nazi Germany was tempted by the eugenic ideal, even
though it did not have the genetic capabilities that are possible today.
Thus, the danger is far greater than it was in Nazi Germany or in early 20th
century America. People all over the globe are already implementing PGD
and IVF technology to choose the sex of their children. 45 Eugenics cannot
be much further behind.
3. Socioeconomic Divide
If states do not regulate HGGM, then there is no incentive for parents
not to seek genetic enhancements.146 If HGGM use is widespread, then
parents would feel compelled to use the technology to ensure that their
children will remain competitive with others. However, only the wealthy
can currently afford the technology. As such, the current social and
economic gap will only get wider.
1 47
The state interests in protecting genetic diversity, preventing eugenics,
and not exacerbating the socioeconomic divide would only be truly
relevant were HGGM implemented on a massive scale, which seems
unlikely. Thus, these state interests, taken separately, would be too weak to
satisfy strict scrutiny and may not even be sufficient to meet rational basis
with bite or rational basis review. However, taken together they may be
enough to rise to the level of a legitimate interest that justifies state
regulation under rational basis with bite and rational basis review.
Similarly, if the Court uses the liberty analysis, the combination of these
interests might rise to a sufficient legitimate interest as required by
Lawrence. Thus, state restriction on HGGM based on the public interest
might be warranted, albeit weakly.
144. Attanasio, supra note 59, at 1306 n.162 ("Sir Francis Galton, who coined the term
eugenics,' believed that its aim was to give to the more suitable races or strains of blood a better
chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Danis, supra note 56, at 241-42 ("Because sex is analogous to these latter attribute
genes, the advent of sex selection forebodes widespread genetic manipulation for the fulfillment
of mere preference.").
146. Robertson, supra note 48, at 479.
147. Attanasio, supra note 59, at 1306.
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The Supreme Court has found that "states have a compelling interest
in protecting the life, health, and safety of their citizens."' 148 Whether the
numerous state interests are enough to justify state regulation depends on
the analysis the Court applies. If HGGM is recognized as a fundamental
right under traditional due process, then the Court will subject the
regulation to strict scrutiny. The Court will likely only find an outright ban
on HGGM to be narrowly tailored when the state interest is in protecting
the health, safety, or Fourteenth Amendment personhood rights of the
state's children. Even with these compelling interests, the Court may find
an outright ban too broad. Regulation that prohibits HGGM for
enhancement purposes, however, will likely be narrowly tailored to meet
the rigid standard of strict scrutiny.
In the alternative, if the Supreme Court does not rule that HGGM is a
fundamental right, then it will apply rational basis review, rational basis
with bite, or the liberty analysis as a substitute for traditional substantive
due process. Under these fairly minimal standards, nearly all of the state
interests discussed would satisfy the legitimate interest required. Since it is
very probable that the Supreme Court will not categorize the use of HGGM
as a fundamental right, states will be free to regulate the use of HGGM
with few limitations.
IV. The Time Is Now- Implementing Policy and Regulation
States will likely be able to regulate HGGM without violating an
individual's constitutional rights. Depending on the standard applied and
the state interest involved, a total ban on the technology could be upheld
while restrictive laws will definitely be sustained in nearly all cases. The
next question that arises is how states should effectuate their laws. The




Many believe that the safety and associated risks of HGGM are far
greater than the potential benefits; and thus a complete ban is warranted.
150
Advocates of a ban fear that the technology will be used to create "designer
babies" with improved traits and abilities, which could have negative
effects on society-such as fostering eugenics, commodification of human
148. Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 131, at 428 n.29; see, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (finding that removing child abuse victims from their parents is a
compelling interest).
149. Baruch, supra note 8, at 43.
150. Id.
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life, and decreased genetic diversity.' 51 Under this line of reasoning, the
benefits to the small number of couples who would use HGGM to avoid
serious genetic disease need to be balanced against the safety concerns and
the risks to the future of humanity. 52 For supporters of a complete ban, the
balance tips in favor of the safety concerns of humankind.
Several methods could be used to ban HGGM in the United States. 53
Congress or state legislatures could pass a law prohibiting the use of
HGGM. 154 In the alternative, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
could create a policy that does not allow clinical research using HGGM to
proceed. 155 Without further clinical testing, researchers could not prove
HGGM safe, thus effectively banning the technology altogether.
The United Nations could also play a role in implementing a
worldwide ban through an international convention against HGGM.
15 6
George Annas, a professor of law at Boston University, and his peers have
drafted a "Convention on the Preservation of the Human Species," which
could serve as the model for a United Nations ban.'57 Such a treaty would
prohibit HGGM because it is a "species-altering" technology. 58  This
global approach attempts to preserve the "human species" by preventing




Regulation of HGGM will ensure the safety of the technology and its
ethical use, preventing against potential abuses. 16 0  The FDA or the
Recombinant DNA Advisory Council ("RAC") would be good government
bodies, already in existence, to oversee the use of HGGM. 161 These
agencies will need to address the long-term outcomes of the genetically









159. George J. Annas, Lori B. Andrews, & Rosario M. Isasi, Protecting the Endangered
Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM.
J. L. & MED. 151, 151-78 (2002).
160. Baruch, supra note 8, at 44.
161. Id. at44-45.
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federally funded and controlled longitudinal studies. 62 Additionally, the
agencies must also set safety standards both for clinical research and for
actual application of the technology. 163 Furthermore, these bodies will
need to set limits on the use of HGGM. For example, they could
specifically bar all enhancement use of HGGM and allow HGGM only in
circumstances designed to eliminate fatal genetic diseases or those genetic
diseases that seriously affect the quality of life.'64
Finally, the FDA or RAC will likely need to address equity and justice
concerns, perhaps passing laws to ensure equal access to HGGM.
1 65
V. Conclusion
Under a traditional substantive due process analysis, the Supreme
Court will not likely recognize HGGM as a fundamental liberty interest
because it is not a traditional form of reproduction. Thus, the courts will
likely use the less demanding rational basis review or rational basis with
bite to determine the constitutionality of state regulation of the technology.
However, even if the courts did recognize HGGM as a fundamental liberty
interest, there are a few compelling state interests that could satisfy strict
scrutiny, such as safety of the genetically modified child and the child's
Fourteenth Amendment individual rights. Because strong compelling
interests exist which justify regulation, the states may be able to institute an
outright ban HGGM; but it is more likely that they will be able to regulate
the technology. 166 For instance, states could pass laws prohibiting the use
of enhancement HGGM.
Society and technology are advancing at astounding rates. No longer
is abortion the only critical and controversial procreative liberty issue.
Reproductive liberty rights are headed in the direction of genetic
modification. As a society, we must address the ethical, legal, and social
implications of HGGM before an irrevocable usage of HGGM occurs.
How we choose to oversee HGGM has important implications for other
technology, such as the recent explosion of nanotechnology as applied to
162. Id. at 44.
163. See Dresser, supra note 99.
164. Baruch, supra note 8, at 45.
165. Id. Note that this would raise funding concerns such as whether or not states would be
required to subsidize the technology.
166. States would be able to regulate under strict scrutiny, rational basis review, rational basis
with bite, and the liberty analysis. See supra Part III.
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transhumanism. 167 Will the human race continue to be unheedingly shaped
by chance or by the choice of imperfect human beings? C.S. Lewis warned
that if humans attain the power to shape descendants, "all men who live




The future of the human race is in our hands.
167. For a general discussion of nanotechnology, see Institute on Biotechnology and the
Human Future, Nanotechnology, http://www.thehumanfuture.org/themes/101_nano.htm (last
visited last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
168. Lewis, supra note 1, at 57.
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